Some corrections to the We the People podcast on the Lincoln-Douglas debates

I am a big fan of the National Constitution Center's "We the People Podcast" series hosted by Jeffrey Rosen, President of the center. They are informative, thoughtful, and engaging. The guests are noted experts in the field. I am not quibbling with anyone's expertise, but guest Sidney Blumenthal made two big misstatements early in a recent episode that covered the topic of the Lincoln-Douglas debates, and I am assuming that this slip of the tongue can be attributed more to nervousness than to lack of knowledge. This jumped out at me precisely  because I spent a lot of time over the last twenty years teaching and stressing the nuances of the Missouri Compromise, the 1850 Compromise, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act. You can listen to the podcast and/or view the transcript here.

So, what was it that caught my ear? Blumenthal, a biographer of Abraham Lincoln, stated:

"Blumenthal: [00:02:57] The Missouri Compromise was the original compromise of 1821 which established a certain line of (landitude) across the country. Above which, in the North, slavery was prohibited. Below which, in the south, slavery was allowed, and that permitted two states to be admitted to the Union balancing each other. Maine, a free state, and Missouri as a slave state, and that held the peace, as it were, in politics until the Mexican war."

The Missouri Compromise did not draw a line across the country; the 36-30 line was applied specifically only to the territory gained in the Louisiana Purchase. The importance of the Missouri Compromise was that Congress determined the status of slavery in the territories before they could become eligible for statehood. Other than Missouri, only Arkansas became a slave state. Iowa and Minnesota were admitted as free states before the Civil War, but there was plenty of territory north of the compromise line to become future non-slave states. This is why Southern advocates of slavery, like John C. Calhoun, felt they had gotten a bum deal. They would be more careful next time.

Despite the Missouri Compromise, peace did not reign in the political realm. Nullification, the gag rule, abolition, liberty laws, Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, and the intense debate over the admission of Texas are some examples of political battles over slavery between 1820 and 1850.

Blumenthal had this to say about the 1850 Compromise:

"In the Mexican War, a great amount of land was taken from the Mexican's and the question was 'What would happen to it?' Would it be divided into states? Would they be free or slave? It led to an enormous conflict which led to the Compromise of 1850, and that basically kept the Missouri Compromise and added a few things to it."

This is incorrect. The 1850 Compromise had nothing to do with the Missouri Compromise because they covered two different things. As the Missouri Compromise covered the Louisiana Purchase territory, the 1850 Compromise addressed what to do with land taken in the Mexican War. President James K. Polk suggested that the Missouri-Compromise line be extended across this new territory, but that was non-starter. The fact that California was admitted as a non-slave state in 1850 demonstrates that the 36-30 line, which was the key component of the Missouri Compromise, played no part in the 1850 compromise.

These are not minor points. They are important milestones in the conflict over slavery as it evolved and grew over the nineteenth century. One cannot understand why the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 was such an explosive issue without knowing the details of the Missouri and 1850 compromises. As Blumenthal noted, it was the Kansas-Nebraska Act that brought Abraham Lincoln out of political retirement and put him on the path to famous debates with his rival Stephen Douglas in 1858.

Crowdsourcing at the LOC and the Chapman Prisoners

The Library of Congress created a crowdsource project (here) for transcribing archival material in their collections. This looked like fun, so I created an account. If nothing else, I thought my expertise as an historian might prove beneficial. In the mid-1990s I had done some similar work transcribing Civil War muster rolls in the Lancaster (Pennsylvania) Historical Society. Now in 2019 I am transcribing letters sent to Abraham Lincoln concerning his 1864 re-election campaign.

One of the items I transcribed yesterday was telegram dated January 19, 1864 from San Francisco, California and addressed to Attorney General Edward Bates. "Application about to be made to discharge Chapman," it started. However, I could not read the word after Chapman. I assumed it was a name. So, I conducted some searches and concluded that the word following Chapman was indeed "prisoners." What was all this about and why was US Attorney William Sharp telling the attorney general about this? Sharp wanted to tip the administration off to the fact that the Chapman prisoners were going to apply for relief under Lincoln's amnesty proclamation. They were prepared to take an oath of loyalty in exchange for amnesty.

Who were the Chapman prisoners? In 1863 a group of Confederate sympathizers attempted to seize a ship in San Francisco harbor with the idea of converting it into a commerce raider. The US marshal foiled the plot and ultimately three men were convicted for violating the Confiscation Act of 1862. Lincoln pardoned one of the pirates on condition that he leave the country. The two remaining prisoners were not the only ones who wondered how widely the amnesty proclamation could be applied. Could it be applied, for example, to those who had been charged or convicted of a crime? Did it apply to copperheads in the north or others who were non-combatant sympathizers? After sitting on Sharp's telegram for a month, Lincoln issued a circular to the US attorneys affirming that the amnesty proclamation could be applied to those on trial or who had been convicted of crimes of rebellion. This established an important precedent for Reconstruction policies because it essentially negated the Confiscation Act. Anyone convicted under the act could apply for amnesty in exchange for an oath of allegiance. Andrew Johnson freely granted amnesty, paving the way for former Confederates to return to government positions after the war.

I gave a few minutes of my time in this crowdsourcing venture, but I think I received much more in return in how it expanded my knowledge of the American Civil War.

If you want to know more about this, see Robert J. Chandler. "The Release of the Chapman Pirates: A California Sidelight on Lincoln's Amnesty Policy." Civil War History 23 (June 1977): 129-43.

The surrender at Port Hudson, July 9, 1863

One hundred and fifty-one years ago today,  the rebel forces surrendered Port Hudson, Louisiana to the Union. Five days after the capitulation of Vicksburg, the capture of Port Hudson secured complete Union control of the Mississippi River.  My Great-great-great Grandfather Mathias J. Petry was present at the surrender. As a Lieutenant in the 173rd New York regiment, he saw the elephant, as Civil War soldiers referred to their first battle, at Port Hudson. According to his muster roll, he was assigned to brigade commander General Charles Jackson Paine's staff in May and June 1863. Following the surrender of Port Hudson, Mathias moved to the divisional staff. He returned to New York in August. Although his regiment remained in Louisiana, and later participated in the Red River campaign of Nathaniel Banks, it looks like Lieutenant Petry returned to New York, where he remained for most of the rest of the war on what his muster roll described as "detached service." He was honorably discharged in June 1865.

AHA Conference Review: Saturday January 4, 2014, the rest of the day

After our panel concluded on Saturday, I went to the book exhibition, visited the poster session (which I did not easily find), and finished the day by attending James McPherson's Society of Military History lecture, "The Rewards of Risk Taking: Two Civil War Admirals." Like many historians I could easily recognize McPherson. In addition to having read several of his books, I have seen him numerous times on television. His lecture focused on the subject of his most recent book, a naval history of the Civil War, which I admit I have not read. Not sure if I ever will, but that is a statement on my limited reading time, not on the value of McPherson's work. Craig Symonds's Civil War at Sea, which I have read, covered the subject masterfully. Symonds's was present in the audience and McPherson acknowledged him and his expertise. McPherson's lecture compared Union Admirals Samuel DuPont and David Farragut to  Generals George McClellan and Ulysses Grant. In this analogy DuPont and McClellan are the dilatory commanders who sought to mitigate risks, while Farragut and Grant were more gutsy commanders willing to take a gamble and double down in the next move. The main point being that in engagements that involved thousands of men on both sides, the outcome often depended on the personality and command traits of the leaders. I enjoyed the lecture, but I have some qualms with an approach that puts all the agency in the hands of the Union commanders. In my humble opinion chance and luck are underrated factors in historical events, especially in military history.

I then waited an hour for a shuttle back to the Hilton that never came. I missed the last one of the evening by a couple of minutes, but did not see the sign until later. It was a cold, dark walk across the bridge, but only a 20 minute walk.