Was author, conservationist, and zoologist William T. Hornaday (1854-1937) a gun control advocate?
One might think so and make that argument as David Kopel did in the Washington Post in June 2017. You can read the story here. Basically, his argument is that because Hornaday advocated for a limitations in the use of pump and automatic shotguns and silencers for hunting, he advanced the cause of gun control. The guest host of the Thomas Jefferson Hour radio show and podcast, David Swensen, equated the shotgun regulations with gun control, although his was more a passing comment and he did not mention Hornaday. Here is a link to the show.
The introduction of pump and automatic shotguns in the first years of the twentieth century alarmed Hornaday. He was gravely concerned that Americans killed wildlife, particularly birds, exponentially, while animals reproduced arithmetically. In other words, hunters killed wild animals at a much greater rate than they could naturally reproduce. In time, Hornaday believed, we would exterminate nearly all animals, if his contemporaries did not stop the slaughter. He reckoned that would occur by 1950. Hornaday's preferred solution was to ban the use of these deadly weapons, but failing that his fall back position was to limit them to a maximum of three rounds. Hunters, including the conservationist sportsman, resisted this. Every time Hornaday went on a rant about shotguns, George Bird Grinnell dropped a dime on him to his pal Madison Grant. Yes, that Madison Grant! Notorious, Nazi-inspiring racist that he was, Grant was also a conservationist, Hornaday's boss at the Bronx Zoo, and Grinnell's friend. Finally, in 1935, after more than thirty years of Hornaday's agitation, the federal government implemented the three cartridge limit. An old and embittered Hornaday thought it was too little, too late. We still have a limit on cartridges. A plastic plug is included with any new pump shotgun purchase. You can read all about in my biography of Hornaday, The Most Defiant Devil.
I am not going to say that this isn't gun control. But, I do want to demonstrate that Hornaday's views on guns was quite complicated. In 1925 the Society for the Prevention of Crime offered a $2,500 prize for the best plan to reduce crime in New York City. Hornaday submitted his proposal on December 10, 1925 (a copy is in Hornaday's Wildlife Conservation Society papers at the Bronx Zoo). Hornaday hated Italians (he devoted a chapter in Our Vanishing Wildlife to how Italians were killing songbirds) and considered them natural criminals. He was alarmed by the growth and brazenness of organized crime in the 1920s. He was particularly concerned about the spirit of lawlessness during prohibition in New York City.
What was Hornaday's proposal? Among other things he wanted to repeal the Sullivan Law that required handgun owners to get a permit to carry their weapons concealed. Moreover, he wanted to encourage all homeowners, business owners, and any "custodian of money" to purchase a handgun. "It is utterly impossible to prevent by law, " he wrote, "or even to check, the sale of firearms and ammunition to members of the criminal classes, and it is a waste of time to attempt it." He also called for longer prison terms, penal colonies, hard labor, increased application of the death penalty, and three strikes and you are out sentencing. Hornaday urged a total overhaul of the criminal code. And, lastly, he considered the fourth and fifth amendments to the Constitution "dry rot." "They should be repealed, or otherwise nullified," he added. Going even further, he suggested that courts compel defendants to testify under oath. It should be noted be never suggested the repeal of prohibition.
Sunday, September 22, 2019
Sunday, September 15, 2019
Some corrections to the We the People podcast on the Lincoln-Douglas debates
I am a big fan of the National Constitution Center's "We the People Podcast" series hosted by Jeffrey Rosen, President of the center. They are informative, thoughtful, and engaging. The guests are noted experts in the field. I am not quibbling with anyone's expertise, but guest Sidney Blumenthal made two big misstatements early in a recent episode that covered the topic of the Lincoln-Douglas debates, and I am assuming that this slip of the tongue can be attributed more to nervousness than to lack of knowledge. This jumped out at me precisely because I spent a lot of time over the last twenty years teaching and stressing the nuances of the Missouri Compromise, the 1850 Compromise, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act. You can listen to the podcast and/or view the transcript here.
So, what was it that caught my ear? Blumenthal, a biographer of Abraham Lincoln, stated:
"Blumenthal: [00:02:57] The Missouri Compromise was the original compromise of 1821 which established a certain line of (landitude) across the country. Above which, in the North, slavery was prohibited. Below which, in the south, slavery was allowed, and that permitted two states to be admitted to the Union balancing each other. Maine, a free state, and Missouri as a slave state, and that held the peace, as it were, in politics until the Mexican war."
The Missouri Compromise did not draw a line across the country; the 36-30 line was applied specifically only to the territory gained in the Louisiana Purchase. The importance of the Missouri Compromise was that Congress determined the status of slavery in the territories before they could become eligible for statehood. Other than Missouri, only Arkansas became a slave state. Iowa and Minnesota were admitted as free states before the Civil War, but there was plenty of territory north of the compromise line to become future non-slave states. This is why Southern advocates of slavery, like John C. Calhoun, felt they had gotten a bum deal. They would be more careful next time.
Despite the Missouri Compromise, peace did not reign in the political realm. Nullification, the gag rule, abolition, liberty laws, Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, and the intense debate over the admission of Texas are some examples of political battles over slavery between 1820 and 1850.
Blumenthal had this to say about the 1850 Compromise:
"In the Mexican War, a great amount of land was taken from the Mexican's and the question was 'What would happen to it?' Would it be divided into states? Would they be free or slave? It led to an enormous conflict which led to the Compromise of 1850, and that basically kept the Missouri Compromise and added a few things to it."
This is incorrect. The 1850 Compromise had nothing to do with the Missouri Compromise because they covered two different things. As the Missouri Compromise covered the Louisiana Purchase territory, the 1850 Compromise addressed what to do with land taken in the Mexican War. President James K. Polk suggested that the Missouri-Compromise line be extended across this new territory, but that was non-starter. The fact that California was admitted as a non-slave state in 1850 demonstrates that the 36-30 line, which was the key component of the Missouri Compromise, played no part in the 1850 compromise.
These are not minor points. They are important milestones in the conflict over slavery as it evolved and grew over the nineteenth century. One cannot understand why the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 was such an explosive issue without knowing the details of the Missouri and 1850 compromises. As Blumenthal noted, it was the Kansas-Nebraska Act that brought Abraham Lincoln out of political retirement and put him on the path to famous debates with his rival Stephen Douglas in 1858.
So, what was it that caught my ear? Blumenthal, a biographer of Abraham Lincoln, stated:
"Blumenthal: [00:02:57] The Missouri Compromise was the original compromise of 1821 which established a certain line of (landitude) across the country. Above which, in the North, slavery was prohibited. Below which, in the south, slavery was allowed, and that permitted two states to be admitted to the Union balancing each other. Maine, a free state, and Missouri as a slave state, and that held the peace, as it were, in politics until the Mexican war."
The Missouri Compromise did not draw a line across the country; the 36-30 line was applied specifically only to the territory gained in the Louisiana Purchase. The importance of the Missouri Compromise was that Congress determined the status of slavery in the territories before they could become eligible for statehood. Other than Missouri, only Arkansas became a slave state. Iowa and Minnesota were admitted as free states before the Civil War, but there was plenty of territory north of the compromise line to become future non-slave states. This is why Southern advocates of slavery, like John C. Calhoun, felt they had gotten a bum deal. They would be more careful next time.
Despite the Missouri Compromise, peace did not reign in the political realm. Nullification, the gag rule, abolition, liberty laws, Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, and the intense debate over the admission of Texas are some examples of political battles over slavery between 1820 and 1850.
Blumenthal had this to say about the 1850 Compromise:
"In the Mexican War, a great amount of land was taken from the Mexican's and the question was 'What would happen to it?' Would it be divided into states? Would they be free or slave? It led to an enormous conflict which led to the Compromise of 1850, and that basically kept the Missouri Compromise and added a few things to it."
This is incorrect. The 1850 Compromise had nothing to do with the Missouri Compromise because they covered two different things. As the Missouri Compromise covered the Louisiana Purchase territory, the 1850 Compromise addressed what to do with land taken in the Mexican War. President James K. Polk suggested that the Missouri-Compromise line be extended across this new territory, but that was non-starter. The fact that California was admitted as a non-slave state in 1850 demonstrates that the 36-30 line, which was the key component of the Missouri Compromise, played no part in the 1850 compromise.
These are not minor points. They are important milestones in the conflict over slavery as it evolved and grew over the nineteenth century. One cannot understand why the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 was such an explosive issue without knowing the details of the Missouri and 1850 compromises. As Blumenthal noted, it was the Kansas-Nebraska Act that brought Abraham Lincoln out of political retirement and put him on the path to famous debates with his rival Stephen Douglas in 1858.
Tuesday, September 10, 2019
Michigan War Studies Review and Stevenson's 1917: War, Peace, and Revolution
Need help deciding which military history book read? I highly recommend the Michigan War Studies Review . There are a vast number of quality book reviews covering topics from the ancient world to the present. I have been honored to review several books for this site. Here is my latest: David Stevenson's masterful 1917: War, Peace, and Revolution Click Here.
Part II, “Continental Impasse,” contains six chapters: two on Russia, and one each on France, Flanders, Italy, and the peace initiatives of 1917. As in 1916, both sides conducted joint planning conferences to coordinate their operations. The order of the day was more of the same, but on a grander scale, featuring new weaponry, absurdly optimistic expectations, and underestimations of enemy strength. The French Nivelle, British Third Ypres (Passchendaele), and Russian Kerensky offensives all fit this pattern. Nivelle succeeded only in triggering mutiny among his own troops, while Kerensky broke the will of the Russian army and people, opening the door for the Bolshe- viks as the only anti-war party.
The Entente held no monopoly on military efforts that backfired. The humiliating defeat the Austro-Hungarians and Germans inflicted on the Italians at Caporetto ironically caused their en- emy to rally to the flag as it had not done since 1915; moreover, increased support from its western allies left Italy in a better position than it held prior to Caporetto.
The final chapter of Part II examines the several peace initiatives of 1917. Various belligerents conducted backchannel discussions largely unbeknown to their allies and without the full support of their own governments. In fact, such negotiations tended to be ploys meant to divide enemies rather than genuine attempts to end the war. No matter how bad the situation on the front lines or at home, no governmental leaders, with the exception of the Bolsheviks, seriously considered peace in 1917.
The three chapters of Part III focus on the “Global Repercussions” of poorly considered policy choices of 1917 that resonate to this day. The European powers never understood that they had lost control of events. Believing they were making measured moves, in reality they opened a Pan- dora’s Box. Britain used India (which then included present-day Bangladesh and Pakistan) as its base for military operations in Mesopotamia, but also as a source of manufactured supplies and equipment, tax revenues, and, crucially, manpower at a time when Prime Minster David Lloyd- George was dunning British colonies for more troops. All this placed great strains on Indian socie- ty and led to demands for reforms, including home rule. But the concessions the British made in the 1919 Government of India Act did not give the Indians all they wanted. They were, depending on one’s perspective, a first step either in the right direction or down a slippery slope, as Lord Curzon of the War Cabinet argued. Each reform led to calls for more complete home rule; this ultimately undermined both British control in South Asia and European global imperialism in general.
In the Middle East, as Gen. Edmund Allenby’s force was driving towards Jerusalem, the British feared that the Zionist movement leaned too sympathetically toward Germany. Policy-makers in London felt a need to win over an increasingly important international constituency (especially after the American entry into the war) and undermine Ottoman control in the region, with a view to constructing a zone of control in postwar Palestine to protect the Suez Canal. They gave little thought to what creating a Jewish national homeland might actually mean or its potential impact on the Arab population.
"Sympathy with Zionism carried less weight, unsurprisingly, than perceptions of national and impe- rial interest. The same applied to France’s Cambon Declaration, which paved the way for the British one, although American support appears to have been derived more simply from Wilson’s idealism. The British hoped to use the Zionists, as the Zionists hoped to use the British, and both sides over- estimated what the partnership might bring. But for all the opportunism that surrounded it, after other 1917 legacies had receded the declaration’s consequences would endure. (361)"
2019-074 19 Aug. 2019
1917: War, Peace, and Revolution by David Stevenson.New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2017. Pp. xxv, 480. ISBN 978–0–19–870238–2.
Review by Gregory J. Dehler, Front Range Community College (gregdehler@centurylink.net).
In his new book, historian David Stevenson (London School of Economics) argues that, by 1917, the European belligerents of the Great War found themselves ensnared in a conflict they knew to be unsustainable. Both sides sought to break the deadlock by launching massive offensives. Their desperate gambles failed to bring victory and hundreds of thousands of combatants died in Flan- ders, France, Italy, and Russia. That year1 saw the entry of the United States into the war and the historic revolutions in Russia. Brazil, China, Greece, and Siam also joined the war in that year, making the conflict a true “world war.” Unrest in India forced a reluctant Great Britain to accede to a degree of home rule that ultimately led to independence. And, too, the Balfour Declaration changed the future of the Middle East. In short, 1917 marked a dramatic shift in world history.
Other authors have sought to better understand the First World War by concentrating on a single year of its duration.2 Indeed, Stevenson’s last book was an account of 1918.3 There is a cer- tain logic to this tactic, since elections, military operations and campaigns, and vagaries of agri- cultural and industrial production make each calendar year unique. The present volume, however, adopts a broader, global view, surveying events in the Americas, on Europe’s battle- fields, in the Middle East, and across Asia.
The fourth year of World War I witnessed greater coordination among members of both the Central Powers and the Entente. Political leaders exerted increasing influence on strategy and policy making, but could not altogether wrest control from military commanders. The complexi- ties of conducting a global industrial war while managing developments on the home front and in imperial holdings simply overwhelmed economic, military, and political leaders. Most of their policy choices were reached only after contentious debates and little consensus.
"Decisions were taken not in calm and isolation but in rapid-fire succession and as fragments of an interconnected whole. The sheer range of choices confronting the belligerents—from Flanders to Russia, India, and Palestine, to say nothing of the home fronts—seems overwhelming. Certainly statesmen must by definition be risk takers, and challenging and contested choices lie at the heart of their responsibilities. Yet in wartime the stakes grow higher and the imponderables vaster. (398)"
The first of the book’s four parts, “Atlantic Prologue,” comprises three chapters concerning major trends: (a) the German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in an effort to cripple Great Britain before the United States could properly mobilize its forces; (b) President Woodrow Wilson’s request for a declaration of war against Germany, with an eye to influencing any postwar settlements and making the world safe for democracy; and (c) Britain’s implementation of the convoy system, a move the war cabinet had to force on Adm. John Jellicoe, who would have pre- ferred to keep his destroyers at Scapa Flow to guard against the German fleet.
1917: War, Peace, and Revolution by David Stevenson.New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2017. Pp. xxv, 480. ISBN 978–0–19–870238–2.
Review by Gregory J. Dehler, Front Range Community College (gregdehler@centurylink.net).
In his new book, historian David Stevenson (London School of Economics) argues that, by 1917, the European belligerents of the Great War found themselves ensnared in a conflict they knew to be unsustainable. Both sides sought to break the deadlock by launching massive offensives. Their desperate gambles failed to bring victory and hundreds of thousands of combatants died in Flan- ders, France, Italy, and Russia. That year1 saw the entry of the United States into the war and the historic revolutions in Russia. Brazil, China, Greece, and Siam also joined the war in that year, making the conflict a true “world war.” Unrest in India forced a reluctant Great Britain to accede to a degree of home rule that ultimately led to independence. And, too, the Balfour Declaration changed the future of the Middle East. In short, 1917 marked a dramatic shift in world history.
Other authors have sought to better understand the First World War by concentrating on a single year of its duration.2 Indeed, Stevenson’s last book was an account of 1918.3 There is a cer- tain logic to this tactic, since elections, military operations and campaigns, and vagaries of agri- cultural and industrial production make each calendar year unique. The present volume, however, adopts a broader, global view, surveying events in the Americas, on Europe’s battle- fields, in the Middle East, and across Asia.
The fourth year of World War I witnessed greater coordination among members of both the Central Powers and the Entente. Political leaders exerted increasing influence on strategy and policy making, but could not altogether wrest control from military commanders. The complexi- ties of conducting a global industrial war while managing developments on the home front and in imperial holdings simply overwhelmed economic, military, and political leaders. Most of their policy choices were reached only after contentious debates and little consensus.
"Decisions were taken not in calm and isolation but in rapid-fire succession and as fragments of an interconnected whole. The sheer range of choices confronting the belligerents—from Flanders to Russia, India, and Palestine, to say nothing of the home fronts—seems overwhelming. Certainly statesmen must by definition be risk takers, and challenging and contested choices lie at the heart of their responsibilities. Yet in wartime the stakes grow higher and the imponderables vaster. (398)"
The first of the book’s four parts, “Atlantic Prologue,” comprises three chapters concerning major trends: (a) the German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in an effort to cripple Great Britain before the United States could properly mobilize its forces; (b) President Woodrow Wilson’s request for a declaration of war against Germany, with an eye to influencing any postwar settlements and making the world safe for democracy; and (c) Britain’s implementation of the convoy system, a move the war cabinet had to force on Adm. John Jellicoe, who would have pre- ferred to keep his destroyers at Scapa Flow to guard against the German fleet.
Part II, “Continental Impasse,” contains six chapters: two on Russia, and one each on France, Flanders, Italy, and the peace initiatives of 1917. As in 1916, both sides conducted joint planning conferences to coordinate their operations. The order of the day was more of the same, but on a grander scale, featuring new weaponry, absurdly optimistic expectations, and underestimations of enemy strength. The French Nivelle, British Third Ypres (Passchendaele), and Russian Kerensky offensives all fit this pattern. Nivelle succeeded only in triggering mutiny among his own troops, while Kerensky broke the will of the Russian army and people, opening the door for the Bolshe- viks as the only anti-war party.
The Entente held no monopoly on military efforts that backfired. The humiliating defeat the Austro-Hungarians and Germans inflicted on the Italians at Caporetto ironically caused their en- emy to rally to the flag as it had not done since 1915; moreover, increased support from its western allies left Italy in a better position than it held prior to Caporetto.
The final chapter of Part II examines the several peace initiatives of 1917. Various belligerents conducted backchannel discussions largely unbeknown to their allies and without the full support of their own governments. In fact, such negotiations tended to be ploys meant to divide enemies rather than genuine attempts to end the war. No matter how bad the situation on the front lines or at home, no governmental leaders, with the exception of the Bolsheviks, seriously considered peace in 1917.
The three chapters of Part III focus on the “Global Repercussions” of poorly considered policy choices of 1917 that resonate to this day. The European powers never understood that they had lost control of events. Believing they were making measured moves, in reality they opened a Pan- dora’s Box. Britain used India (which then included present-day Bangladesh and Pakistan) as its base for military operations in Mesopotamia, but also as a source of manufactured supplies and equipment, tax revenues, and, crucially, manpower at a time when Prime Minster David Lloyd- George was dunning British colonies for more troops. All this placed great strains on Indian socie- ty and led to demands for reforms, including home rule. But the concessions the British made in the 1919 Government of India Act did not give the Indians all they wanted. They were, depending on one’s perspective, a first step either in the right direction or down a slippery slope, as Lord Curzon of the War Cabinet argued. Each reform led to calls for more complete home rule; this ultimately undermined both British control in South Asia and European global imperialism in general.
In the Middle East, as Gen. Edmund Allenby’s force was driving towards Jerusalem, the British feared that the Zionist movement leaned too sympathetically toward Germany. Policy-makers in London felt a need to win over an increasingly important international constituency (especially after the American entry into the war) and undermine Ottoman control in the region, with a view to constructing a zone of control in postwar Palestine to protect the Suez Canal. They gave little thought to what creating a Jewish national homeland might actually mean or its potential impact on the Arab population.
"Sympathy with Zionism carried less weight, unsurprisingly, than perceptions of national and impe- rial interest. The same applied to France’s Cambon Declaration, which paved the way for the British one, although American support appears to have been derived more simply from Wilson’s idealism. The British hoped to use the Zionists, as the Zionists hoped to use the British, and both sides over- estimated what the partnership might bring. But for all the opportunism that surrounded it, after other 1917 legacies had receded the declaration’s consequences would endure. (361)"
Formerly neutral nations began to join the Entente in 1917. The experiences of Greece, Brazil, Siam, and China proved that a belligerent could participate in the conflict in various ways. Brazil, for example, made little contribution to the war effort, while Siam sent a contingent of 1,254 vol- unteers to join the fight; Greece provided over 150,000 men to the Entente campaign in the Bal- kans. China sent no armed forces, but dispatched over 100,000 laborers to the Western Front to haul supplies and dig trenches, among other tasks. The experiences of Brazil and Siam illustrate the scope of the German submarine strategy, which affected more than just the United States. In- ternal debates over the proper course of action proved divisive in the halls of neutral powers. The question of declaring war brought both Greece and China to the brink of civil war. In the end, like Wilson, both nations wagered that any hardship they endured would further their national securi- ty goals in the postwar peace. Like other high-stake calculations made in 1917, this one failed to pay off.4
The concluding Part IV, “Towards 1918,” concerns the Bolshevik takeover of the Russian gov- ernment and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which took Russia out of the war and placed even more emphasis on the Western Front. In one last desperate venture to end the war, the Germans went over the top in 1918. Their spring offensives shocked the British and French and threatened Paris, but the arrival of the Americans, who put a million men on the front lines before the armistice, turned the tide. As in their rationale for resuming unrestricted submarine warfare the year before, the Germans had bet against the United States and, once again, lost badly.
1917: War, Peace, and Revolution represents a thoughtful synthesis of relevant secondary literature and published primary and archival sources. Its narrative is enriched by an invaluable bibliography, maps and photographs spread throughout the text, and helpful lists of abbreviations and principal personalities. It is a seminal work that will engage and inform students, scholars, and general readers alike.
Footnotes:
The concluding Part IV, “Towards 1918,” concerns the Bolshevik takeover of the Russian gov- ernment and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which took Russia out of the war and placed even more emphasis on the Western Front. In one last desperate venture to end the war, the Germans went over the top in 1918. Their spring offensives shocked the British and French and threatened Paris, but the arrival of the Americans, who put a million men on the front lines before the armistice, turned the tide. As in their rationale for resuming unrestricted submarine warfare the year before, the Germans had bet against the United States and, once again, lost badly.
1917: War, Peace, and Revolution represents a thoughtful synthesis of relevant secondary literature and published primary and archival sources. Its narrative is enriched by an invaluable bibliography, maps and photographs spread throughout the text, and helpful lists of abbreviations and principal personalities. It is a seminal work that will engage and inform students, scholars, and general readers alike.
Footnotes:
1. More precisely, December 1916–January 1918.
2. E.g., Max Hastings, Catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War (NY: Knopf, 2013); Lyn Macdonald, 1915: The Death of Inno- cence (NY: Holt, 1995); Keith Jeffery, 1916: A Global History (NY: Bloomsbury, 2015); and Gregor Dallas, 1918: War and Peace (NY: Overlook Pr, 2001).
3. Viz., With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U Pr, 2011).
2. E.g., Max Hastings, Catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War (NY: Knopf, 2013); Lyn Macdonald, 1915: The Death of Inno- cence (NY: Holt, 1995); Keith Jeffery, 1916: A Global History (NY: Bloomsbury, 2015); and Gregor Dallas, 1918: War and Peace (NY: Overlook Pr, 2001).
3. Viz., With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U Pr, 2011).
4. See Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World (NY: Random House, 2003).MichiganWarStudiesReview 2019–074
Monday, September 2, 2019
Samuel Gompers
In honor of Labor Day, here is an entry I wrote on Samuel Gompers for the Encyclopedia of Activism and Social Justice, edited by Gary Anderson and Kathryn G. Herr. Thousand Oaks, Calf: Sage Publications, 2007.
Samuel Gompers(1850-1924). American labor leader and president of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), 1886 to 1895 and 1896 to 1924.
Samuel Gompers was born in London, England to a Jewish family of laborers. In 1863 after spending the first thirteen years of his life on the tough London streets, Sam immigrated to the United States with his family. They settled in the tenements of the lower east side of Manhattan and became cigar makers. In 1864 Sam joined local 144 of the United Cigar Makers Union. In 1866 Gompers married Sophia Julian, also a Jewish émigré from London. The couple had over a dozen children.
Gompers continued to roll cigars, but he increasingly devoted more time and energy in the capacity of union organizer. The cigar industry was thrown into disarray by the introduction of the cigar mold which turned the skilled cigar makers into unskilled machine operators. In 1875 Gompers became president of Local 144. The following year he called a strike in New York City against companies who utilized the cigar mold. Initially, he was successful in gaining wage increases. Part of the reason for his success rested in his use of a benefit system for striking workers financed by union dues. However, independent cigar rollers who worked out of their tenement flats also went on strike and the companies took a harder line. Unable to control the situation, the strike fizzled out in early 1878. Gompers was blacklisted and had a difficult time finding decent work. These were hard times on his growing family. Disillusioned, Gompers resigned his position in Local 144 and moved his family to Brooklyn in order to gain a fresh start.
Two years later, he returned to the union movement and dedicated his life to the cause of improving the working and living conditions of laborers. In 1880 he was once again elected president of Local 144 and he began a battle against the unskilled tenement rollers who, he believed, were damaging the livelihood of the skilled cigar makers who worked in the factories. The wretched pay and conditions of the tenement rollers degraded the condition of all labor. His aggressive lobbying led New York State to pass a law effectively abolishing tenement cigar manufacturing. The state supreme court, however, eviscerated the law. Later the legislature passed a revised bill that met the court’s objections, but almost no municipality in the state enforced it.
Gompers learned four key lessons during these early years of union leadership. First was the limitation of political action. Instead of obtaining laws, he focused his efforts on improving the lives of workers by gaining concrete benefits from employers through collective bargaining. As an adjunct to his belief in the near futility of political action, he believed that the labor movement needed to avoid direct political affiliation. Labor, he argued, should not mingle with politics or form a separate workingman’s party as the socialists professed. Gompers believed that political action should only occur after workers had first leveled the economic playing field. Moreover, the political crusades for causes outside of the workplace, such as the free coinage of silver, as advocated by the Knights of Labor, distracted from the central mission of improving the lives of the workers. When he did take a strong position on a political issue, such as support of Chinese exclusion, it related directly to the condition of labor. Second, his strategy required stronger unions with a benefits system to support strikers, centralized control over when a strike would be called, and a required consensus among union members approving a strike. Strikes, according to Gompers, should he planned, rational events, not a spontaneous and emotional measure. Third, he bitterly opposed dual unionism. A fractured and divided labor movement created a gap that hostile business owners could exploit. Fourthly, Gompers became convinced that trade unionism, focusing on the conditions of the skilled laborer, was the best way to lift all workers. In response to his four lessons, he proposed a federation of labor unions. The first attempt, begun in 1881, proved too weak and failed. He had better success in his second effort. In 1886 he organized the American Federation of Labor and was elected president.
His first objective as president of the AFL was the eight hour day and he called for a nationwide strike on May 1, 1886. The disaster at Haymarket square hurt the cause dearly. The depression of 1893-1896 hit workers hard. Depression induced unemployment deprived Gompers of the dues he needed to fund his strike benefits system. Gompers received criticism for his failure to provide greater support to the Homestead and Pullman strikes and it briefly cost him the presidency of the AFL.
After his return to the AFL presidency in 1896 he moved the union headquarters from Indianapolis, Indiana to Washington, DC to better his lobbying efforts. He became a fixture on Capitol Hill advancing the cause of labor to individual Congressman and before committees. Gompers remained president until his death in 1924. He used the force of his personality and patronage to build a reliable and effective political machine inside the AFL. To keep his fingers on the pulse of the membership, he traveled frequently, logging as much as 50,000 miles in rail travel in a year.
After 1896 Gompers shifted attention from the eight hour day to the right of collective bargaining and increasing the membership of the AFL. He negotiated directly with business leaders and worked closely with Mark Hanna and the National Civic Federation. This course increasingly distanced him from the growing ranks of socialists and radicals. Playing on the emotions and ideals of the progressive era, Gompers presented himself to the business leaders as a sane third choice between immoral wage slavery and the radical International Workers of the World (IWW). In 1906 he supported a boycott against the Buck’s Stove Company and was charged with contempt. He refused to back down or accept a lesser charge. This act of martyrdom improved his standing among the workers and counteracted the tendency some who viewed Gompers as being too conservative.
Despite his efforts, Gompers could not contain the growing popularity of the radical IWW or of the Socialist Party. The AFL opposed the IWW-managed strike in Lawrence, Massachusetts which lasted from 1912 to 1914.
In 1906 Gompers put fourth a Bill of Grievances. His intention was that the federal government would create something like a labor bill of rights. In 1912 Gompers welcomed the friendly overtures of Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic candidate for president. His support of Wilson paid off when the president signed the Clayton Anti-Trust Act in 1915. Although this embodied a small part of the Bill of Grievances, he proclaimed the Clayton Act “the magna carta” of labor because it exempted unions from prosecution under the restraint of trade clause in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890.
Despite the fact that Gompers had advocated pacifism his entire life, he supported American entry into World War I in April 1917. Gompers held important positions in Wilson’s war-time government. As a member of the National Council of Defense and other committees, Gompers brokered a deal in which labor agreed to an unwritten no-strike pledge in return for an eight hour day provision, increased pay, and a minimum wage. During the war union membership skyrocketed from 2.4 million to 3.3 million workers. At the same time the radical unions who spoke out against the war became increasingly marginalized. Gompers supported prosecution of radical labor leaders under the Sedition Act. The success Gompers enjoyed and the defeat of his enemies within the labor movement seemed to vindicate his strategy and ideals. He was at the apex of his career.
Success, however, was short lived. The end of the war also meant the end of labor’s gains. Gompers did not support the strikes of 1919 and correctly predicted that the labor movement as a whole would suffer a backlash in the court of public opinion. The election of Republican Warren G. Harding as president in 1920 marked a conservative revival and the restoration of a pro-business atmosphere in Washington. At the same time, businesses undercut unions by offering company-sponsored alternatives.
The last four years of Gompers’s life were painful ones. The death of his wife Sophia in 1920 filled him with grief. His second marriage was an unhappy one, and, he had begun divorce proceedings before he died. He completed his autobiography, Seventy Years of Life and Labor which was published posthumously in 1925. Gompers’s one great initiative of the decade was an unsuccessful drive to create a federation of unions representing the nations of the Americas. The radicalism of the Latin American unions frustrated his attempts at moderation. He died in 1924 of Bright’s Disease while returning from a trip to Mexico.
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