I
must admit that I have never been a big William Jennings Bryan fan. He always
struck me as a bit a whack job. In A Godly
Hero, Michael Kazin reminds us that the Great Commoner played an important
role in transforming the Democratic Party from the conservative, states-rights
policies of Grover Cleveland to the liberal, national party associated with Franklin
Roosevelt. Ironically, Kazin sees Bryan as a conservative figure that considered
corporate-driven industrialization a radical force that could destroy American families,
the Jeffersonian economy of farmers and mechanics, and the very project of
democracy itself.
Kazin
dismisses any lingering claims that the Boy Orator was selected as a dark horse
in 1896, arguing instead that the crafty and ambitious Bryan had been actively working
for the nomination for a year prior to the convention. By 2014 standards that
would make him a late- comer, but in 1896 it was an early start. Having been
nominated by the Democratic Party, Bryan ran an electrifying and novel campaign,
but one that had only the slimmest possibility of success. In defeat Bryan’s
supporters bonded to their hero. No other losing politician enjoyed such
devoted loyalty. So potent was his spell, that the Democrats wheeled him out
for two more drubbings. When not campaigning, Bryan worked his way through the
lecture circuit advocating prohibition. Although his third loss more or less
disqualified him from a fourth nomination in 1912, he was instrumental in
steering the convention towards New Jersey Governor Woodrow Wilson. Kazin
argues that Bryan exercised some influence on the New Freedom, and it should be
as much a part of his legacy as his other projects. A Godly Hero finds one major flaw in its subject: He failed to
stand for racial justice and too often sided with Jim Crow.
President
Wilson acknowledged both Byran's support in the 1912 convention and his
standing in the party by appointing him secretary of state. Bryan, who had
campaigned in 1900 on an anti-imperialism message, wanted the United States to
deviate from Roosevelt's jingoism and Taft's dollar diplomacy, by adopting a moral
foreign policy. He succeeded to some extent in tempering Wilson's heavy hand in
Latin America. But Kazin draws attention to the tension this created for the
nation's chief diplomat. Despite his own views and preferences, he still had to
serve his president.
When
it comes to World War I Bryan stumbled badly in the estimation of his
biographer. Bryan argued that the British bore prime responsibility for the loss
of American life when a German submarine torpedoed the Lusitania in May 1915. Even before the sinking, he expressed
concern that Wilson's British-leaning policy compromised American neutrality. Critical
of both the British blockade and the German U-Boat campaign, he argued before
the cabinet that any American citizens who traveled on belligerent ships did so
at their own peril. Then, when the crisis occurred, Bryan choked. Instead of
using the sinking as a platform to protest the American failure to uphold
neutrality, he bowed to the president's wishes and signed a strongly worded threat
to Germany that he himself had objected to. Then, he resigned in such a friendly
manner that it did nothing to sharpen the differences between him and the chief
executive. Following his departure from the cabinet, Bryan continued to serve
Wilson. Bryan campaigned for Wilson in the 1916 election, and might have played
a decisive role in the president's reelection.
After
the United States entered the war, Bryan attacked profiteers and made it a
point not to castigate German citizens.
Bryan's
reputation might have been improved if he had gone down in a blaze of glory
protesting Wilson Administration's policy. Of course, such a course was
complicated by the fact that he had signed the note to Germany, a fact that
leaves Kazin scratching his head. On the other hand, Bryan was a politician and
wanted his party to remain in power. He had worked his whole life to see a strong
Democratic administration in the White House that would use the federal
government as a tool to bring about economic justice. Wilson might be wrong on
war, but he was still vastly superior to a Republican president in either the mold
of either Roosevelt or Taft.
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