AHA Conference Review: Sunday January 5, 2014, 11:00-1:00

The last panel of the conference for me was "New Perspectives on American 'Internationalism' and 'Isolationism' from World War II to the Cold War."

In "Will to Lead the World: Planning Peace before Entering the War, 1939-41," Stephen Wertheim argued that while war waged across Europe in 1939 and 1940, elites in the United States laid the foundations for a post-war superiority. The Fall of France in June 1940 showed how fragile the old order had been, and Nazi Germany's Blitzkrieg across the borders of what, Donal Rumsfeld would later famously call "Old Europe", demonstrated to these elites that the United States had to assert itself as the dominant global force. This new attitude to domination was captured by Henry Luce's famous editorial, "The American Century." Isolationism was discredited as dangerous, inimical to American interests, and selfish. Internationalism would be built on military might and international organizations that emanated from the crucial alliance between the United States and Great Britain.

In "Beyond Isolationists versus Internationalists: Rethinking Conservative Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War," Christopher McKnight Nichols made a case to take the post-war isolationists as serious thinkers about the role of America in the world. He further argued that the term isolationist should be discarded, and the debate recast as one between nationalists and transnationalists. He outlined six arguments used by the nationalists (formerly known as the isolationists) that centered on the bad experiences under Wilson, the expense of maintaing a global military presence, the threat it posed to American exceptionalism, and the threat of domestic tyranny. Nichols discussed Robert Taft's position on foreign policy in detail, making the case that Taft was a nationalist, not an isolationist, who favored some forms of international engagement (United Nations and courts) but not others (NATO). I came away with a much deeper understanding of the post-war anti-internationalist viewpoint.

In "The Great Debate of the Korean War, the Republican Party, and U.S. Cold War Internationalism: Origins, Significance, Legacies," Kevin Kim examined the post-war foreign policy proposals of former-president Herbert Hoover. I have to admit I knew next to nothing about Hoover's post-presidential views of international affairs, and it was a little surprising to hear about them. He opposed war in 1939, and favored negotiation with Germany. His attitude in the Pacific was very much the same, and, according to Kim, Hoover proposed "unconditional peace" with Japan after the fall of Germany. A strong Japan, he felt, could block Soviet expansion into Asia. The use of the atomic bomb revolted him. In Korea, Hoover preferred an air war with no US ground troops. As a Cold War strategy he preferred a "fortress America" approach to the Cold War, with an emphasis on air power. Kim argues while his version of fortress America looked a lot like the New Look policies adopted during the Eisenhower administration, Hoover wanted to also pull US troops out of Europe, greatly reduce foreign aid, and tie assistance to specific policies. It was an interesting discussion, but I think the title of the paper should have named Hoover.

Three distinguished historians called into question some of the assertions of the panel. Melvyn Leffler argued that Wertheim's vocabulary was a little too strong. By arguing that American elite sought global superiority, he overstated their position. It was a case of survival, Leffler argued, not establishing superiority. John Milton Cooper felt that isolationism was still a useful descriptor, and that Nichols had gone too far in trying to paint Taft as not being the isolationist he in fact was. There still are isolationists, Cooper argued, naming a few including Pat Buchanan. Justus Doenecke questioned if Hoover and Taft had really thought out their positions. Both had some nutty ideas. Did Hoover really think anyone in the United States would have supported a president in 1945 who called for "unconditional peace" with Japan?  

AHA Conference Review: Sunday January 5, 2014, 8:30-10:30

Back to the AHA conference. I was up early on Sunday and ready to hit two panels before heading for home. The first panel I attended was entitled, "Clashing Claims to Expertise in Environmental and Energy Controversies: Peak Oil, Acid Rain, and Climatology, 1930-2010." I really enjoyed this panel. All the papers were well done and memorable.

In "Redrawing the Boundaries of Flood Control: Climatology, the New Deal, and the Debate over the Government's Role in Land Use Planning" James Henry Bergman discussed how the deepening understanding of weather patterns, particularly on the creation of moisture, during the 1930s affected government policy. By the end of the decade the notion that rain followed the plow had been replaced with a more nuanced understanding of moisture as the product of weather fronts. This new knowledge validated federal efforts at soil conservation and watershed protection.

In "How Long Can We Keep That Up? Peak Oil as Contested Object in Competing Narratives of Growth, Abundance, and Scarcity" Connemara Doran chronicled M. King Hubbert's (I think I have that name correct) formulation of peak oil theory in 1956, and his subsequent modifications of his theory in the 1960s and 1970s. All I knew about peak oil theory prior to Doran's paper was that some conspiracy theorists have argued that a massive drop in oil availability sometime this century will lead to a catastrophic collapse of civilization with the death of tens of millions. Hubbert, however, was much more optimistic. He predicted  a softer landing. As oil reserves became depleted, he argued, new sources of energy would emerge, and lessen the demand on petroleum.

In "Scientific Uncertainties as Political Escape Routes: Negotiating the 1979 United Nations' Convention on Transboundary Air Pollution," Rachel Rothschild discusses the thorny diplomacy surrounding the European acid rain mitigation agreement. Following a familiar pattern, the nations producing the sulfur dioxide that created the acid rain feared the economic toll that strong regulations would have on their industries, while those that suffered the most from  ill effects of dead lakes and streams were powerless to mitigate the ill effects of the airborne poisons. In this case, the UK played the role of the former and Scandinavian nations were cast in the role of the latter. Positions changed only in 1979 when the United States put significant pressure on the UK, France, and West Germany to come to the table. Nevertheless, the subsequent agreement contained no binding reduction targets. If nothing else, the experience of a regional transnational effort at pollution control highlights the enormous obstacles that obstruct a global agreement on carbon emissions.

#TheWorldWars

Whoa! The History Channel is actually airing a history program this week. "The World Wars" is a three episode story that connects World War I and World War II through the lives of several key players, including Churchill, FDR, Hitler, MacArthur, Mussolini, Patton, and Stalin. There are, of course many key players like Dwight Eisenhower, George Marshall, Harry Truman, and any other German, Briton, or Soviet not mentioned above, who were overlooked, but I guess that the show would have lost its focus if it included too many characters.  Overall the first episode of the series, which aired last night on Memorial Day, is entertaining. There were some amateurish mistakes (maybe because the History Channel is out of practice making history shows?), such as using World War II tanks in World War I and indiscriminate use of firearms (all sides used the the British Lee-Enfield .303). There is some cheesy overacting and strange cinematography. Patton rode the outside of his tank into combat without even a helmet on. In another strange scene Benito Mussolini snipes at three German soldiers. Wearing what appears to be a dress uniform (and, again, no helmet) loads the rounds individually like a big game hunter, as he fires at his quarry. One wonders why the Germans didn't drop into the tall grass and return fire. In another scene, I wondered if FDR was really alone with Woodrow Wilson when the president received a copy of the Zimmermann Telegram. And there was some misleading overemphasis to move the story along. For example, one might get the impression that George Patton was the only one who recognized the importance of the tank in warfare. In fact, he was a fairly minor player in developing the tactics to suit the new technology. British thinkers like Fuller and Hart had a greater impact on armored warfare, and, of course, we cannot ignore the German commanders who implemented the Blitzkrieg. In the United States Adna Chaffee had more influence on developing the armored branch.

Chester A. Arthur's bed

File this in the category of "you never know where you will run into presidential history, even for Chester A. Arthur." This is his bed, which is displayed at the Ghost Town Museum in Colorado Springs. According to Carl Anthony the bed was passed down to Arthur's son and grandson, who both lived in Colorado Springs (by-the-way you can read about more presidential bed history at the list link).

AHA Conference Review: Saturday January 4, 2014, the rest of the day

After our panel concluded on Saturday, I went to the book exhibition, visited the poster session (which I did not easily find), and finished the day by attending James McPherson's Society of Military History lecture, "The Rewards of Risk Taking: Two Civil War Admirals." Like many historians I could easily recognize McPherson. In addition to having read several of his books, I have seen him numerous times on television. His lecture focused on the subject of his most recent book, a naval history of the Civil War, which I admit I have not read. Not sure if I ever will, but that is a statement on my limited reading time, not on the value of McPherson's work. Craig Symonds's Civil War at Sea, which I have read, covered the subject masterfully. Symonds's was present in the audience and McPherson acknowledged him and his expertise. McPherson's lecture compared Union Admirals Samuel DuPont and David Farragut to  Generals George McClellan and Ulysses Grant. In this analogy DuPont and McClellan are the dilatory commanders who sought to mitigate risks, while Farragut and Grant were more gutsy commanders willing to take a gamble and double down in the next move. The main point being that in engagements that involved thousands of men on both sides, the outcome often depended on the personality and command traits of the leaders. I enjoyed the lecture, but I have some qualms with an approach that puts all the agency in the hands of the Union commanders. In my humble opinion chance and luck are underrated factors in historical events, especially in military history.

I then waited an hour for a shuttle back to the Hilton that never came. I missed the last one of the evening by a couple of minutes, but did not see the sign until later. It was a cold, dark walk across the bridge, but only a 20 minute walk.

AHA Conference Review: Saturday January 4, 2014, 11:30-1:30 pt 2

Now for the rest of the panel, with gratitude to Jonathan Anzalone for organizing our panel and guiding it through the approval process.

In "In Search of a Skier's Paradise: New York State and the Development of Skiing in the Adirondack Park, 1932-67" Jonathan cataloged the misadventures of state sponsored recreation. In this case, New York sought to promote skiing, which gained in some popularity after the 1932 Winter Olympics were held at Lake Placid, NY with a state owned and operated resort. At the same time, the state sought to goose the economy of the Adirondack region, which enjoyed a unique status as a state park. Very poor execution undermined these lofty ideals. After a decade of hard work, in which supporters obtained a successful state referendum to revise the state constitution to allow the construction of a resort on protected land. It was only after the state constructed a highway to the resort, built the resort, and promoted it throughout the region, that it was revealed that they had put all their hopes in the wrong place. It was a disaster. The mountain was too steep for inexperienced skiers to safely manage. It was also too dry and windy, which resulted in a dangerous, ice-covered course. In the early 1960s the slope was among the first to utilize artificial snow blowers. The community experienced no economic benefits, and the experience left such a bitter taste in the minds of voters that a referendum to create another state operated sky resort failed in 1961. The site is currently a weather station.

In "Disneylands with Trout: Environmental Change and Conflict on Tailwater Fisheries" Jen Corrinne Brown described how the promotion of recreation led to environmental consequences for a range of native fish species. As dams stopped the flow of a river, they created a still area referred to as tailwater. Adaptable and valued trout thrived in this new environment with its warmer water. States sought to promote recreational fishing by stocking these areas with trout. This is where the Disney Land reference comes in. Abundant trout created a cheap thrill of easily getting some keepers. Jen argued that this created an artificial experience of nature somewhat akin to Disney Land. The cost for this policy was paid for by the local species that thrived in the cooler water of the freely flowing rivers and streams. Deemed "trash fish" and poorly valued by anglers, no effort was made to protect or propagate the native species. A more subtle ecological impact effected other parts of the ecosystem as well. Alterations in flow and fish species led to changes in plant and insect life. There was a human cost to increasing numbers of fishermen. In the case of the Bighorn River in Montana, the Crow Indians lost control of the river through their reservation as well as their ability to regulate the anglers on their reservation.  Once again, Native Americans were screwed.

In "Run the Caldera: The Contested Politics of Wilderness Recreation in Northern New Mexico" Sarah Stanford-McIntyre chronicled the conflict over the first land trust established by the United States government. Created in 2000, the Caldera trust piloted a unique government-private cooperative effort at environmental protection. This approached, however, was plagued with problems. In its effort to become economically sustainable by 2015, the trust raised fees; marketed several recreational activities, including a marathon, van tours; hunting, and fishing; and maintained a working ranch. Leaving the land in a wild, untrammeled state or allowing free or unrestricted hiking did not fit into the plan to create a sustainable trust. The situation was ripe for a political contest between the conservative, profit-minded trust and its more liberal ecologically-minded critics. As the trust struggled to make money with increasing fees and more activities to attract paying customers, the conflict escalated.  At this point the trust will not hit its 2015 target. On the other hand, efforts to turn the land over to the Forest Service for management have also made no progress. Thus, the conflict over the use of the land has resulted in paralysis.

My tenuous genealogical connection to the 1916 Easter Rising

John A. Kilgallon was born in the Village of Far Rockaway in 1891. His father Luke Kilgallon and

mother Nora Walsh Kilgallon immigrated from County Mayo. They married in the United States, and I cannot say whether or not they knew each other in the old country. John was their only son. My connection (remember I said it was tenuous) to the Kilgallon family is that my grandmother's half-sister, Agnes Cosgrove, was Nora Walsh's niece. Agnes immigrated to the United States in 1912 at the age of 16 and lived with her aunt's family.

Luke was a blacksmith who wisely learned how to fix cars and built a prosperous auto repair and gas station in the Far Rockaways. He patented a device to put tires onto the rims. In 1914 he sent his son to St. Enda's school in Dublin. There John was decisively influenced by the school's founder, Patrick H. Pearse, one of the leaders of the 1916 Easter Rebellion. Known as "The Yank" John drilled as part of a unit known as "Pearse's Own" consisting of current and former St. Enda's students. He was in the Post Office during the thick of the combat, and surrendered with Pearse after six days of heavy fighting. After his capture, the British sent John to Frongoch Prison Camp in Wales. The authorities offered to release him if he swore an oath of allegiance to the British crown. John rejected this offer. As he stated in a letter to his father that was later published in the Brooklyn Eagle in February 1917,  he could not make such an oath without violating the principles that he had and his comrades had fought to uphold. America's Ambassador the Court of St. James, Walter Page, pressed the British government to release "The Yank." The British government yielded to the pressure, most likely thinking of the larger political picture, and Kilgallon was released on Christmas Day 1916. John served his country in World War I as a machinist in the United States Navy. From his service record, it appears that spent the entire war in stateside naval bases. John died in 1972 at the age of 80.

My mother who had known John described him as a very quiet, almost meek man. She could not believe he would have participated in such a violent event. One wonders how the this youthful experience shaped the rest of his life.